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Ideas of Roy Sorensen, by Text
[American, fl. 2002, Professor at Dartmouth College.]
2001
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Vagueness and Contradiction
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Intro
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p.1
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9116
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Vague words have hidden boundaries
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Intro
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p.4
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9118
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The colour bands of the spectrum arise from our biology; they do not exist in the physics
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Intro
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p.8
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9119
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No attempt to deny bivalence has ever been accepted
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1.4
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p.38
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9121
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Illusions are not a reason for skepticism, but a source of interesting scientific information
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11.1
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p.168
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9137
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Banning self-reference would outlaw 'This very sentence is in English'
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11.2
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p.173
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9139
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If nothing exists, no truthmakers could make 'Nothing exists' true
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11.6
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p.183
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9140
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Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'?
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3.2
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p.61
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9122
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God cannot experience unwanted pain, so God cannot understand human beings
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4.3
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p.74
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9124
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We are unable to perceive a nose (on the back of a mask) as concave
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4.3
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p.75
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9125
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Denying problems, or being romantically defeated by them, won't make them go away
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6.1
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p.96
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9126
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Bayesians build near-certainty from lots of reasonably probable beliefs
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6.3
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p.99
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9128
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It is propositional attitudes which can be a priori, not the propositions themselves
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6.3
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p.100
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9130
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Attributing apriority to a proposition is attributing a cognitive ability to someone
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6.3
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p.100
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9129
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I can buy any litre of water, but not every litre of water
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6.4
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p.101
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9131
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Two long understandable sentences can have an unintelligible conjunction
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7.2
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p.112
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9132
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An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or'
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7.7
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p.121
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9133
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Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences
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8.1
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p.125
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9134
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The negation of a meaningful sentence must itself be meaningful
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8.4
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p.132
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9135
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We now see that generalizations use variables rather than abstract entities
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8.5
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p.138
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9136
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The paradox of analysis says that any conceptual analysis must be either trivial or false
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